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So far, terrorism tends to be considered using asymmetric warfare methods 
rather than proxy warfare methods. Even though some terror attacks around the 
world carried out by people inspired by terrorism indicate that terrorist groups 
such as IS are carrying out proxy warfare methods. Based on this problem, the 
following article will describe the threat of IS terrorism through proxy warfare. 
The aims of this research to map the threat of IS proxy warfare on Indonesian 
Millennial Muslims. By using library research methods, this research is expected 
to have positive implications for the efforts to deradicalize terrorism among 
Indonesian Millennial Muslims. The conclusion of this research obtained 
shows that the advancement of communication technology has facilitated 
IS to spread its terrorism in Indonesia through online magazine propaganda 
in Bahasa Indonesia. This effort is really a threat for Indonesian Millennial 
Muslims who are very active in using the internet daily. In this way, IS seeks to 
influence Indonesian Millennial Muslims to become their proxy in running 
nikayah operations independently. Thus, the threat of terrorism throughout 
the world has also evolved from the threat of asymmetric warfare to the threat 
of proxy warfare, especially to Millennial Muslims.
Sampai sejauh ini, terorisme cenderung dianggap menggunakan metode 
peperangan asimetris daripada peperangan proksi. Meski begitu, beberapa 
serangan teror di seluruh dunia yang dilakukan oleh orang-orang yang terinspirasi 
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terorisme mengindikasikan bahwa kelompok teroris semacam IS sedang 
menjalankan metode peperangan proksi. Berdasarkan permasalahan ini, artikel 
berikut akan menjelaskan ancaman terorisme IS melalui peperangan proksi. 
Tujuan dari penelitain ini adalah memetakan ancaman peperangan proksi IS 
pada Muslim Milenial Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan metode penelitian 
pustaka, penelitian ini diharapkan dapat berimplikasi positif pada usaha 
deradikalisasi terorisme pada Muslim Indonesia. Kesimpulan penelitian sendiri 
menunjukkan bahwa kemajuan teknologi komunikasi telah memfasilitasi IS 
untuk menyebarkan terorisme di Indonesia melalui propaganda majalah daring 
dalam Bahasa Indonesia. Upaya ini benar-benar menjadi ancaman bagi Muslim 
Milenial Indonesia yang sangat aktif menggunakan internet setiap hari. Dengan 
cara ini, IS berusaha mempengaruhi Muslim Milenial Indonesia untuk menjadi 
wakil mereka dalam menjalankan operasi nikayah secara mandiri. Dengan 
demikian, ancaman terorisme diseluruh dunia juga telah berevolusi dari 
ancaman peperangan asimetris kepada ancaman peperangan proksi khususnya 
pada Muslim Milenial.
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Introduction
On August 28, 2016, a 17-year-old teenager carried out an attack on 
a church in Medan, Indonesia. The perpetrator is a high school fresh 
graduate teenager. He is considered not a part of the Islamic State (IS) 
terror network. However, IS propaganda through the internet allegedly 
inspired the teenager.1 Sources from the local police also confirmed the 
allegations.2 The teenager seemed to try to carry out attacks such as in 
Paris and Saint-Denis, France. The incidents in Paris and Saint-Denis 
itself were simultaneous terror attacks that occurred on 13 November 
2015 that caused 128 fatalities.3 IS claimed responsibility for the attack. 
1 Deutsche Welle Online, “Penyerang Bunuh Diri Di Gereja Katolik Medan Terobsesi 
Pimpinan Isis Al Baghdadi”, in http://www.dw.com/id/penyerang-bunuh-diri-di-gereja-
katolik-medan-terobsesi-pimpinan-isis-al-baghdadi/a-19510515 , accessed on 3 June 2018.
2 Heyder Affan, “Terduga Pelaku Serangan Di Gereja Medan Terinspirasi Teror Prancis”, 
in http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2016/08/160828_indonesia_
medan_penyelidikn, accessed on 3 June 2018.
3 BBC News Online, “ISIS Mengaku Sebagai Pelaku Serangan Paris”, in http://
www.bbc.com/indonesia/dunia/2015/11/151114_dunia_paris_isis, accessed on 3 
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They also said that the action was carried out by eight Caliphate troops 
in response to the air strike of the Coalition forces on IS.4 
Compared to the terror in Paris, the incident in Medan was a single 
attack that failed to cause damage and loss of life. However, the attack 
indicated that the internet network could send an inspiring message to 
carry out acts of terror. Besides Medan, similar attacks also occurred in 
several other countries. In Australia, Man Haron Manis and Numan 
Haider carried out the similar attacks. While Martin Couture-Rouleau 
and Michael Zehaf - Bibeau did the same action in Canada. Furthermore, 
Zale Thompson carried out terror attacks in the United States. There was 
still another attack in France by Bertrand Nzohabonayo. 
Except, the attack in Medan, IS recognized those entire terrorist acts 
as the answers of the Caliphate call to strike those waging war against IS 
wherever they were.5 The IS recognition shows that they are carrying out 
proxy wars outside their territories in Iraq and Syria. The proxy warfare 
itself is a product of the relationship between the donor and the chosen 
proxy. Donors can be in a form of state or non-state actors who will 
distribute funds, weapons and training to the chosen proxy to fight.6 In 
simpler language, proxy warfare can be interpreted as a war by using the 
power of the third party. By using the hands of others, this group seeks to 
spread terror throughout the world. 
Although IS has been indicated to run the war by proxies, terrorism 
tends to be considered using asymmetrical warfare methods rather than 
proxy warfare.7 The terrorist attacks themselves, along with rebellions, 
June 2018.
4 Islamic State, “Just Terror”, Dabiq, Issue 12 (November 2015/Safar 1437), 28.
5 Islamic State, “Al Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within”, Dabiq, Issue 6 
(December 2014/ Rabi’al Awwal 1436), 3-4.
6 Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and The Future of Conflict”, The RUSI Journal, 
Volume 158, Number 2 ( May 2013), 41.
7 Russell P. Galeti Jr, “Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare”, Landpower Essay, Number 
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roadside bombs, weapon proliferation of mass destruction, and 
sophisticated computer viruses are still classified as part of asymmetrical 
warfare.8 This shows the most actual terrorism strategy has evolved from 
asymmetric warfare to proxy warfare.  
The proxy warfare strategy carried out by IS is basically their 
adaptation to the sophistication of information technology. IS utilizes 
this sophistication to form a proxy, through information warfare using 
virtual networks. Information warfare using cyber networks is one of the 
proxy warfare modes. This cyber mode proxy warfare utilizes community 
depends on computer networks and makes it an ideal vehicle in proxy 
formation strategies.9 With this mode, proxy wars are enough to carry 
out by disseminating information through the internet to influence 
internet users to become proxies who will fight against the enemies. 
However, this mode is a more complex threat to the affected parties, 
because those who are exposed to the threat of this model will not be 
easy to identify who the opponent is and where the battlefield is. The 
difficulty of identifying opponents and battlefields is the cause of terror 
acts even though the security forces of each country have carried out a 
high-level terror prevention operation. 
The biggest proxies potency formed in this way are the people or 
groups of people who use the internet in their daily lives. In Indonesia, 
the penetration of internet users amounted to 143.26 million people. 
From that figure, 16.68 percent comes from the age group 13-18 years and 
49.52 percent came from the age group 19-34 years.10 Thus, 76 percent of 
the internet users in Indonesia come from the age group of 13-34 years. 
04-3 (October 2004), 2.
8 David L. Buffaloe, “Defining Asymmetric Warfare”, The Land Warfare Papers, Number 
58 (September 2006), 3.
9 Andrew Mumford, “Proxy Warfare and The Future of Conflict”…, 43.
10 APJII,  Penetrasi & Perilaku Pengguna Internet Indonesia, Asosiasi Penyelenggara Jasa 
Internet Indonesia, Survei 2017.
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This age group is the Millennials, the generation born between 1981 and 
2000.11 By this fact, Indonesian Millennials are one of the groups that 
have the most potential as IS proxies. 
Based on this issue, the following article aims to describe the threat 
of IS proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. This study used a 
literature research method with proxy warfare approach. The results of this 
study are expected to give positive implications for the de-radicalization 
of terrorism in Indonesia, especially for Indonesian Millennial Muslims. 
IS and proxy warfare
IS embryo is an organization called Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad. Abu 
Mushab al- Zarqawi was the founder of this organization. In the late 
1980s, Zarqawi participated in anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Thus, 
he is one of the Afghan war veterans.12 In Afghanistan, Zarqawi began a 
close relationship with Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi who would become 
his teacher to study Jihadi-Salafism teachings.  Between 1994 and 1999, 
Zarqawi and Maqdisi were imprisoned in Jordan. After his release in 
1999, Zarqawi returned to the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to establish a 
training camp in the city of Herat. The training camp serves as a centre 
for jihadists who are more inclined to tighter Salafi theology.
Initially, Zarqawi distanced himself from al-Qaeda, whose main base 
was in eastern Afghanistan. He also did not give promises of loyalty to 
Osama bin Laden. Therefore, he and his organization did not submit 
to the authority of Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.13  After the 
US invasion of Afghanistan, Zarqawi and his associates moved to the 
11 Leesa Tanner, Who are the Millennials? Defence R&D Canada–Centre for Operational 
Research and Analysis, 2010, 10.
12 Islamic State, “Al Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within”…, 41.
13 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, Analysis Paper, 
No. 19,  Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 2015, 13.
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northern Kurdish region in 2002. There they formed a group called 
Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad (God’s Unity and Jihad Group). Only two 
years later, in 2014, Zarqawi gave allegiance to Osama Bin Laden.14 With 
this allegiance, Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad is known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(AQI).15 However, from 1999 to 2004, the Zarqawi group was only known 
as Jamaat Tawhid Wa al-Jihad.16 
Furthermore, on 15 January 2006, Zarqawi formed the Mujahideen 
Shura Council, which unites al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) with five other 
jihadist organizations operating in Iraq. Approximately six months later, 
a US air strike killed Zarqawi. Nevertheless, his death did not stop the 
existence of the Mujahideen Shura Council. Even in October 2006, the 
Mujahideen Shura Council announced the establishment of an “Islamic 
State of Iraq” (ISI). However, the Mujahideen Shura Council leaders 
did not consult the formation of the ISI to the leaders of al-Qaeda and 
immediately caused tensions between the ISI and al-Qaeda. A year later, 
Zarqawi’s successor, Abu ‘Umar al-Baghdadi proclaimed the dissolution 
of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) as a consequence of support for the ISI. With 
this dissolution, ISI and al-Qaeda agreed to split up in Iraq.17 Nevertheless, 
from 2002 to 2011, the ISI was still regarded as the same organization as 
al-Qaeda Iraq (AQI) and Jamaat Tawhid Wa al Jihad.18 
At the end of 2011, ISI sent the troops to Syria to form a jihadi group 
called Jabhat al-Nusra. Jabhat al Nusra later grew into a prominent Sunni 
14 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State, 14; and 
see  Islamic State, “Al Qa’idah of Waziristan: A Testimony from Within”…, 42.
15 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2014: Measuring And 
Understanding The Impact of Terrorism, IEP Report 2014, 58.
16 Fisher Zulkarnain and Tata Septayuda Purnama, “The ISIS Movement and The 
Threat of Religious Radicalism in Indonesia”, Mimbar, Volume 32, Number 1 (June, 
2016), 34.
17 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State…, 16-21.
18 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2012: Capturing The Impact of 
Terrorism from 2002-2011, IEP Report 2012, 32.
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insurgent militant group in the Syrian civil war. However, these two 
organizations kept their relationship confidentially. When ISI leaders 
proclaimed the transformation of ISI to ISIS in 2013, they revealed this 
connection with the words that  Jabhat  al-Nushra was an extension of the 
ISI in Iraq.19 Furthermore, as a consequence of the establishment of ISIS, 
the ISI leader then dissolved ISI and Jabhat al-Nushra at once. Nevertheless, 
Jabhat al-Nusra leaders opposed the decision and immediately declared 
the organization as a part of the al-Qaeda rather than ISIS.20
Further, in early 2014, al-Qaeda confirmed that they had no 
relationship with ISIS and were not responsible for the group’s actions. 
However, ISIS goes further by expanding the power into western Iraq. In 
this expansion, ISIS managed to control western Iraq, including the city 
of Mosul. After that, ISIS proclaimed the establishment of the Caliphate 
on June 29, 2014. After the proclamation, an ISIS official stated that ISIS 
had ended since then. Thus, ISIS has transformed into IS. Their goal is 
no longer limited to control Iraq and Syria but the whole world.21







Jamaah  al-Tauhid 
wal Jihad (JTWJ) 
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
Majelis Syura al-Mujahidin 
(MSM) 
Islamis State of Iraq (ISI) 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syam 
(ISIS) 
1999 - 2004 2004 - 2006 2006 - 2013 2013 - 2014 2014 - Now 
Islamis State (IS) 
19 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State…, 24; and 
see  Makrum,”Tracing The Historical and Ideological Roots of ISI: Shi’ite or Sunni?”, 
Indonesian  Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 2 (December 2016), 
213.
20 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State…, 25: 
and see  Mohammed Nuruzzaman, “The Challenge of the Islamic State”, Global Affairs, 
Volume1, Issue Number 3 (June 2015), 297-304.
21 Cole Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State…, 29-31.
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Basically, the unstable security conditions in Iraq and Syria have 
supported the IS to grow and develop. IS utilizes unstable state conditions 
to shape what they call Jamaah Tawhid Wa al-Jihad. In that place, they will 
use asymmetric warfare methods. In its strategy, this method attempts to 
attack targets that are not strong and utilize limited preparation against 
the threat of attack targets.22 
In the context of warfare of the 19th and 20th centuries, asymmetric 
warfare is run by the non-state that represented by local guerrilla groups 
against the state represented by the colonial states. The purpose of this 
war is to form a state. Thus, asymmetric warfare of the 19th and 20th 
centuries can be simplified as a non-state versus state to become state 
versus state. Admittedly, IS is also practicing this in Iraq and Syria. 
They carry out asymmetric warfare in order to form an Islamic state. 
The simplest example of this type of warfare is Indonesian Independence 
War. During this war, freedom fighter groups acted as non-state actors 
who fought against the Dutch colonial army who acted as state actors. 
The freedom fighter groups carried out hit-and-run tactics to face the 
Dutch army who excelled in all aspects of the military. In the 19th and 
20th century asymmetric warfare, hit-and-run became the most famous 
tactic. Because of its reliability in combat, this tactic became the main 
principle in guerrilla warfare operations. 
Slightly different from the asymmetric warfare in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, in the 21st  century, guerilla warfare operations with the hit-
and-run principle has shifted into a terror war with the principle of piracy 
and bombing. In the 21st century, the terrorist organization represents a 
non-state actor. Moreover, non-state actors in the 21stcentury asymmetric 
warfare do not also make the country in the concept of the nation-state 
22 Bruce W. Bennet,  Christopher P. Twomey, Gregory F. Treverton, What Are 
Asymmetric Strategies? Rand Document Briefing, Monica: RAND, 1999, 3.
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as a goal. Instead, they demand power over the whole world. Thus, the 
ideology of nationality becomes obsolete and looks outdate for them.
Instead, non-state actors in the 21st century asymmetric warfare require 
an ideology that provides the ability to break national barriers. Therefore, 
they later adopted religion as their ideological camouflage. Then, what 
the public knows as the 21st century terrorism is terrorism that carries 
theological ideology. Using this ideological theology, the 21st century 
terrorist groups are trying to get a wider support throughout the world. 
Although camouflage of ideological theology promises broader support, 
its weakness lies precisely on the territory they will fight for. After the fall 
of colonialism in the mid-20th century, the power that made the country 
use more nationalism and nationality platforms as their territorial claim. 
Thus, the 21st century terror organizations will find it difficult to find 
their own homeland.
IS has issued a list of places classified as the suitable places for jihad, 
such as Yemen, Mali, Somalia, the Sinai Peninsula, Waziristan, Libya, 
Chechnya, Nigeria, and parts of Tunisia, Algeria, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines. However, not all of these regions are always the same as 
conditions in Iraq or Syria. Thus, asymmetric  warfare cannot always be 
carried out in regions on the list of Islamic countries. Some countries 
even have very stable security conditions. Therefore, in its strategy, IS is 
trying to create an unstable security in a region through a nikayah attack. 
The underground IS Mujahid cells will carry out nikayah operations to 
kill, injure and devastate the enemy. This action aims to create chaos in 
the region so that the local government loses control of security stability 
in its territory. To achieve this goal, IS uses the Zarqawi method. This 
method uses car bombs, IEDs and istishad bombs. When the area attacked 
by these nikayah operations has been in a very unstable security condition 
like Iraq, IS will then send its followers and sympathizers to migrate to 
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the country. In that region, IS will build a base to form jamaah, recruit 
members and train them. 23 
How did IS form underground Mujahid cells? 
Usually, IS forms the underground Mujahid cells through the formation 
of the jamaah. After that, IS will train them to do the terror attacks. 
However, this method becomes increasingly difficult to succeed. Post 
9/11, security forces in many countries have taken strict monitoring steps 
to prevent the formation of the jamaah. Radical networks such as IS itself, 
have begun to see the use of political resources such as establishing official 
organizations (on the ground) and started to abandon the terrorist tactics 
to run by closing the (underground) networks. 24 
IS is trying to overcome this difficulty by changing their method from 
asymmetric warfare to proxy warfare. Reflecting on the experience of 
the 20th century conflict, the proxy war has been proven to be one of 
the methods capable of fostering extremism such as terrorism.25 So that 
by using proxy warfare, IS no longer tries to form a jamaah and recruit 
Mujahid directly. Instead, IS seeks to foster terrorism throughout the 
world. With this aim, they have replaced the terrorist recruitment system 
through a closed and exclusive cell system into the public domain and 
open access. This method is cheaper, but more effective due to the use 
of an internet communication network. Thus, this proxy warfare can 
be classified as warfare by using cyber network. The terrorist groups 
themselves have long been known to spread their messages and mobilize 
23 Islamic State, “The Return of Khilafah”, Dabiq, Issue 1 (July 2014/Ramadan 1435), 
36-38.
24 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, “The Role of the National Police in Countering 
Insurgencies in Indonesia”, Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, Volume 9, Issue 9 
(September 2017), 8 .
25 Jon B Alterman, “The Age of Proxy Warfare”, Middle East Notes and Comment, 
CSIS Middle East Program (May 2013), 2.
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their supporters using the internet and web networks.26 That is why, they 
can commit terror that reaches the whole world only through their proxies 
such as Man Haron Manis, Numan Haider, Martin Couture-Rouleau, 
Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, Zale Thompson, Bertrand Nzohabonayo, Ivan 
Armadi, and Dita’s family. As the consequence, the threats faced by 
countries in the world are no longer focused on the threat of asymmetric 
warfare but proxy warfare.












Unstable Security  of   
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Threats to Indonesian Millennial Muslims 
According to Gatot Nurmantyo, the degradation of moral and 
nationalistic values, especially for youth, as well as the emerging of 
religious radicalization and infiltration of foreign cultural values are the 
proxy war variant to weaken Indonesia.27 Indirectly, this statement refers 
to the threat of the IS proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. 
As one of the IS targets, in fact, Indonesia is in a stable and stronger 
26 Paul Cornish, David Livingstone, Dave Clemente, Claire Yorke, On Cyber Warfare, 
London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010, 8.
27 Keoni Marzuki, “Proxy Wars Narrative: TNI-AD’s Quest for Relevance?”, RSIS 
Commentary, Number 092 (April 2016).
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security condition than the other Southeast Asian countries. However, in 
the proxy warfare context, Indonesia’s position is more vulnerable. This 
is due to the large Muslim population, the large Millennial Muslims, and 
abundant natural resources. 

















(NON-STATE) PHASE I PHASE II 
CONDITION I CONDITION II 
Basically, IS requires three things above to be able to grow and develop 
in a county outside Iraq and Syria. They need a large Muslim population 
as fertile land to spread terrorism narratives in the camouflage of 
Islamic teachings. With this camouflage, IS spreads their terrorism 
narratives through the internet. Meanwhile, the biggest internet users 
are the Millennial, including Millennial Muslims. Indeed, IS is targeting 
Millennial Muslims to be their proxy. Through proxies from Millennial 
Muslims such as Ivan Armadi, IS carried out terror attacks with the aim 
of creating unstable security conditions in Indonesia. Furthermore, after 
Indonesia’s condition is unstable, IS will carry out asymmetric warfare 
to control a certain area and take its natural resources. With this natural 
resource, IS will finance the war and establish an Islamic state affiliated 
with the Caliphate in Iraq.
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The proxy warfare that poses a threat to Indonesian Millennial 
Muslims is a war that aims to form proxies by using the cyber network 
as a means of transporting the ideology of terrorism. Moreover, this 
cyber-mode proxy warfare also requires appropriate ammunition. This 
need can be analogous to an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). 
As a strategic weapon system, ICBM can be simply divided into two 
components. Both components are rockets that serve as a transport vehicle 
and nuclear warheads that function as a destructive ammunition. The 
nuclear warhead used as ammunition for an ICBM is an option because 
of its tremendous destructive power. This is proportional to the ability 
of its transport vehicle that can reach the distance between continents. 
Due to these two components, an ICBM becomes the weapon with the 
biggest deterrent effect in the world of defense and security. With ICBM 
also, North Korea became so feared by the international community even 
though in general, their military profile is out-of-date.
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The proxy warfare of cyber mode also requires two components 
that are almost the same as an ICBM in order to make it strategic and 
terrible. These both components are the internet network and the IS 
doctrine itself. The internet network serves as a transport vehicle that will 
transmit various IS messages and play the function as a proxy-forming 
narrator. The proxy-forming narratives via the internet also include 
psychological warfare, publicity, propaganda, fundraising, recruitment, 
and networking, information sharing, and planning.28  Therefore, in 
this proxy warfare, mobile phones play a major role. This is in line with 
the increasingly important and widespread use of cellular phones in the 
life of the Millennial, especially smartphones.29 This also happens to 
Indonesian Millennial Muslims, where the smartphone has made the 
internet is within their grasp. Thus, the transport vehicle of IS doctrines 
has become closer to Indonesian Millennial Muslims. Consequently, this 
condition has made the Millennial Muslims as sleeping proxies for the 
IS. The sleeping proxy is just waiting for the right moment to become 
an active proxy. For this reason, IS has played an ingenious battle by 
making Islam as their brand. They modified the Islamic teachings and 
designed it into proxy warfare ammunition. The IS ideology combines 
the Millennial, takfiri, salafi and sectarian components in its powerful 
jihadist narrative.30 
28  Imran Awan,”Cyber-Extremism: ISIS and the Power of Social Media”, Society, 
volume 54, Issue 2 (April 2017), 138–149. 
29 Cortney Weinbaum, Richard Girven, Jenny Oberholtzer,  The Millennial Generation: 
Implications fo the Intelligence and Policy Communities,  Washington D.C.: RAND, 2016, 4.
30 Celso, Anthony, “Dabiq: IS’s Apocalyptic 21st Century Jihadist Manifesto”, Journal 
Political Sciences and Public Affairs, Volume 2,  Issue 4 (January 2014), 1.
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IS Proxy Warfare 
With the IS name, the whole world will know that it is an Islamic 
State. Moreover, the IS also needed this brand to build trust in every 
Millennial Muslims, especially from non-Arabic such as Indonesia. With 
such a globalized name, Indonesian Millennial Muslims will easier to 
recognize IS and identify it as a global brand. This is certainly different 
from al-Qaeda which, although it is popular, but for Indonesian Millennial 
Muslims, that name will be known and only identified as an Arab terrorist 
movement. However, with the IS name, Indonesian Millennial Muslims 
who generally understand English more than Arabic will soon find out 
that it is an Islamic State.  Furthermore, the Indonesian Millennial 
Muslims will obtain impression that the terrorist movement is open to 
anyone including them. Consequently, every Millennial Muslim who 
types the word Islam in an internet search engine on their smartphone 
will have the possibility to connect with the IS propaganda narrative, 
directly or indirectly.
Millennial itself is a generation that is less concerned with 
international terrorism and shows a lower level of support in the war 
on terrorism.31  In this condition, IS branding infiltrates globalization 
31 A.Trevor Thrall and Erik Goepner, Millennials and U.S Foreign Policy: The Next 
Generation’s Attitudes toward Foreign Policy and War (and Why They Matter), Washington 
D.C.: CATO Institute, 2015, 10.
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and lives side by side with Millennial Muslims. IS as a part of Islamic 
fundamentalism is basically not an anti-globalization movement, but 
as a part, participants, and interpreter of globalization itself.32 Thus, 
IS has become part of globalization. Moreover, the number of words 
of terrorism and news about terrorism are heard all over the world 
every day, has made the IS no longer sound frightening and alarming 
for Indonesian Millennial Muslims. In other words, IS is also a part of 
the life of Indonesian Millennial Muslims. Unconsciously, Indonesian 
Millennial Muslims became friendly with IS. Gradually, it will eliminate 
resistance to the doctrines of terrorism.  Further, IS also tries to find out 
who has responded or provided other forms of support on their online 
material. When IS sees support, they will crowd around or at least at an 
early stage, try to meet the needs of their potential proxy candidates while 
seducing them further into the terrorist trap.33  
For Millennial Muslims who spend most of their time exploring and 
searching the internet, getting information about IS is not difficult. IS has 
used Twitter, Facebook and Instagram to influence opponents, friends 
and journalists. These methods have enabled IS to distribute a strong 
emotional image, with the message of winning the Islamic state. Such 
images can be used to build support among internet users and recruit 
new members.34 In this way, IS campaigns their terror war and exposes it 
to the world.  They are not only trying to spread terror, but also to seek 
32 Asep Muhammad Iqbal and Zulkifli,“Islamic Fundamentalism, Nation-state 
and Global Citizenship: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir”, International  Journal of Islam and 
Muslim Societies, Volume 6, Number 1 (June 2016), 37-38.
33 Anne Speckhard, Ardian Shajkovci, Ahmet S. Yayla, ”Defeating ISIS on the Battle 
Ground as well as in the Online Battle Space: Considerations of the “New Normal” and 
Available Online Weapons in the Struggle Ahead”, Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 9, 
Number 4 (2016), 9.
34 James P Farwell, ”The Media Strategy of ISIS”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 
Volume 56, Number 6 (December 2014- January 2015), 50.
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publicity that can connect them throughout the world.
IS began to develop their publicity after the declaration of the Islamic 
state or Caliphate in 2014. Since that year, IS started a more massive step 
to reach publicity. Throughout 2014, they were responsible for six of the 
twenty deadliest terror attacks worldwide.35 Furthermore, they ran seven 
of the twenty deadliest terror attacks during 2015.36 In the same year, 
IS began to expand operating wings to various parts of the world. Their 
attacks began to move out of Iraq and Syria into Bahrain, France, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Saudi, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, and Palestine.37 Their acts 
of terror were becoming increasingly widespread by 2016. During that 
year, they dominated 13 of the 20 deadliest terror attacks in the world.38 
Through its proxies, IS launched terror attacks in Belgium, Georgia, 
Germany, Indonesia, Lebanon, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi, Philippines, 
Turkey, and Yemen. This condition has made IS the deadliest terrorist 
group in the world. Consequently, IS became the most famous terrorist 
group in the world and also a terrorist group with the most publicity 
defeating Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Boko Haram.39
With the conditions described above, the world community has been 
connected with IS either directly or indirectly. In the future, IS may 
disappear in Iraq and Syria, but their proxies can metamorphose into 
new terror groups around the world. Thus, the problem will never be 
completed. Undoubtedly, the greatest danger of the cyber-mode proxy 
warfare lies here.
35 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring And 
Understanding The Impact of Terrorism,  IEP Report 2015, 12-13.
36 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring And 
Understanding The Impact of Terrorism, IEP Report 2016, 12-13.
37 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2016…, 52.
38 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring And 
Understanding The Impact of Terrorism. IEP Report 2017, 12-13.
39 Institute for Economics and Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2017…, 72-73.
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Building a branding and seizing publicity is important in IS’ proxy 
warfare of cyber mode. However, the main thing of this proxy warfare 
is the ammunition that able to form the proxy itself. IS has made the 
teachings of Islam as a camouflage of their organizational ideology. 
They modified the teachings of Islam and made it become an excuse 
to combate humans. Through the argumentation of Quran verses and 
hadiths, IS is trying to convince everyone that their acts of terror are 
also the same actions performed by the Prophet (PBUH) in the war. 
Moreover, IS also tries to show every Muslim in the world that their 
group is the best Muslim group. In this way, IS intimidates Muslims and 
provides only two choices for Muslims around the world, follow their 
path of terror or confront them. With this camouflage, IS is trying to 
infuse their influence on Muslims all over the world. 
IS media strategy has been adjusted to prioritize these religious 
requirements after June 2014. Prior to the declaration of the Caliphate, 
IS military reports were disseminated through Islamic State News 
(ISN) magazine, which was first released on May 31, 2014. Meanwhile, 
IS political reports were disseminated via Islamic State Report (ISR), 
which was first released on June 3, 2014. Then, IS combined ISN and 
ISR into a new magazine called Dabiq. This new magazine brings all 
the propaganda news on IS military, government, and religious activities 
together.40 Furthermore, Dabiq is published in a more authoritarian and 
more religious language than any other terror group publications such as 
Al Qaeda.41 This magazine does not only represent more than propaganda 
40 Harleen K Gambhir, “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State”, 
Backgrounder (August 15, 2014), 3.
41 Matteo Vergani and Ana-Maria Bliuc, “The Language of New Terrorism: Differences 
in Psychological Dimensions of Communication in Dabiq and Inspire”, Journal of Language 
and Social Psychology, volume 37, issue 5 (January 2018), 523–540.
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but also the vision of the Caliphate.42 Undoubtedly, Dabiq serves as an 
ammunition of the IS proxy warfare propagated through the Internet 
network in an effort to attract the sympathy of Muslims around the 
world. Thus, it is not surprising that this magazine is published in several 
languages according to the language of their potential proxy candidates. 
For Indonesian Millennial Muslims, which is one of the potential targets 
of them, IS has also published Dabiq in Bahasa Indonesia. 
The depth of knowledge about Islam makes IS proficient at modifying 
Islamic teachings into narratives for proxy warfare. That skill can certainly 
be seen in how they can relate all their actions to the Qur’an, the hadith 
and the history of the Prophet (PBUH) and the companions of the 
Prophet (PBUH), and the scholars. Thus, it is quite easy for IS to call 
Islam as a religion of swords but not as a religion of peace. This opinion 
they take with postulates on Ali bin Abi Talib who mentioned that the 
Prophet (PBUH) was sent with four swords to fight the polytheists, scribes, 
hypocrites, and apostates. Meantime, IS also argued that the opinion is 
derived from the Islamic root which is not a salam which means peace, 
it refers to Ibn Taymiyyah.43 Further, IS can also easily demonstrate the 
legitimacy of an Islamic state. They argue that the Islamic state is the real 
Imamate. The Imamate is an imamate in politics that is the Caliphate 
of Islam in Surah al-Baqarah:124.44 In order to protect their actions, IS 
mentioned that fighting them is fighting the Caliphate and if it is done 
by fellow Muslims then it is apostasy and disbelief.45
Eventually, IS mentioned that the Mujahideen were the most correct 
42 Haroro J. Ingram, ”An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Magazine”, Australian 
Journal of Political Science, volume 51, issue 3 (2016), 458-477.
43 Islamic State, “From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of Grayzone”, Dabiq, 
Issue 7  (February 2015/Rabi’al Akhir 1436), 20-24.
44 Islamic State, “The Return of Khilafah”…, 22-29.
45 Islamic State, “The Law of Allah or The Laws of Men”, Dabiq, Issue 10  (July 
2015/Ramadan 1436), 50.
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group of people in the Islamic Aqeedah, where the term Mujahid refers 
to themselves.46 Moreover, IS openly call their actions as acts of terrorism. 
IS even stated that the statement on terrorism was not Islam was a 
statement of apostasy.47 With this claim, IS actually tries to introduce 
terrorism by disguising it as Islamic teachings. In the same way, IS tries 
to dictate their readers and viewers to obey their will. Thus, it is not 
surprising that in their publication, there are words that said, there is 
no life without a jihad and there is no jihad without migration to the 
land of the Caliphate.48 Consequently, they also provide guidance and 
steps for jihad as a step of Hijrah, loyalty, listening, obedience, training, 
which leads to ribat and fight then the Caliphate or martyrdom.49 For IS, 
their war against the West was a crusade. Therefore, IS encourages every 
Muslim to kill the crusaders and the murder is proof of support to IS.50 If 
a Muslim does not do what the IS dictates, that Muslim will be classified 
into a group that is hostile to IS or in other words belonging to a pagan 
group. 
With such narratives being spread via the Internet, IS is trying to seek 
the views of Muslims around the world. This effort endangers Muslims 
who are seeking identity and self-development. These kinds of Muslims 
are young Muslim generations who in the context of the 21st century are 
often categorized as Millennial Muslims. As the generation that grows 
and develops along with the development of cyber and information 
technology, the generation of millennial Muslims is the generation 
connected to the internet. This means that this generation has an 
46 Islamic State, “The Flood”, Dabiq, Issue 2 (July 2014/Ramadan 1435), 24.
47 Islamic State, “The Murtadd Brotherhood”, Dabiq (Issue 14, April 2016/Rajab 1437), 
14.
48 Islamic State, “A Call to Hijrah”, Dabiq, Issue 3 (September 2014/Shawwal 1435), 31.
49 Islamic State,“The Return of Khilafah”…, 35.
50 Islamic State,“The Failed Crusade”, Dabiq, Issue 4 (October 2014/Dhulhijjah 1435), 
32-44.
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access to the transport vehicle of IS cyber-mode proxy warfare. With this 
condition, IS proxy warfare ammunition is just waiting to reach its target. 
Actually, IS does not solely spread its doctrine on the internet alone. 
There are at least two dissemination patterns of IS doctrine on the internet. 
The first pattern is the direct spread in which Millennial Muslims find 
IS propaganda on the internet by themselves. The second pattern is the 
indirect spread where the Millennial Muslims get the proxy’s narrative 
from other people. The second pattern is a more complex pattern in 
which the spread can occur consciously or unconsciously and can be 
either whole or original narrative or a narrated and modified narrative. 
The second spreading pattern can form a very long spread chain. With 
this long chain, the proxy-forming narrative will move wildly so that the 
possible proxies forming will become more and more difficult to predict. 
The case of a church attack in Medan by a Muslim Millennial in 2016 
indicates how this proxy warfare of cyber-mode formed its proxies wildly. 
Meanwhile, the use of more open tactics that rely heavily on the internet 
and social media can make anyone, especially troubled to collect IS 
propaganda materials and its ideological theology to act for their own 
importance by making IS as its brand. 51 
Conclusion
The development of the time and technological advances has helped IS 
adjust their war doctrine in order to reach the world more effectively 
and efficiently. Cyber-mode proxy warfare is a choice of IS because of its 
superiority in reach and efficiency in recruiting proxies. Going forward 
IS will actually use its proxies to perform nikayah operations around the 
world. Consequently, the IS’ proxy warfare of cyber-mode will be the 
51 Naufal Armia Arifin, “The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia With Regards to Its Social 
Media Strategy”, Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional, Volume 13, Number 2 (2017), 155.
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world’s major security threat. Meanwhile, Indonesia, which has a large 
number of Millennial Muslims, is a potential target of IS. Thus, the 
threat of IS’ proxy warfare to Indonesian Millennial Muslims is actually 
a threat to Indonesia’s national security too. Therefore, efforts to protect 
Indonesian Millennial Muslims from the threat of IS’ proxy warfare are 
part of efforts to combat terrorism and protect Indonesia’s national 
security. 
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